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Abstract
The recent debate over monetary policy strategies concludes that monetary targeting and inflation targeting in
practice lead to very similar patterns of central bank behavior. This raises the question why central banks insist
on the strategies they use. In this paper, we develop an answer from political economy. After showing that
closed-loop monetary strategies using similar information sets imply similar monetary policy performance, we
argue that monetary strategies are helpful in solving internal and external coordination problems for the central
bank. We illustrate the point by reviewing the Bundesbank’s introduction of monetary targeting in the mid-
1970s.  Monetary targeting was important for the Bank as a signal that the previous monetary regime had been
overcome, as a means to define the role of monetary policy vis-a-vis other players in the macro economic policy
game, and to structure the internal monetary policy debate. The last section discusses the implications of this
view for the new European Central Bank. 1
I. Introduction
The preparation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and its European Central Bank (ECB) has
revived interest in monetary strategies in recent years. In Europe,  much of that debate has recently focused on
the choice between “inflation (forecast) targeting” (Svensson, 1997) and “monetary targeting” for the ECB. 
Following the lead of the Bank of England, inflation forecast targeting was adopted by several European
central banks in the 1990s. Monetary targeting has been the Bundesbank’s strategy since 1975 and is, therefore,
connected with the Bundesbank’s successful low-inflation monetary policy since then. Since the early 1990s,
the French central bank has announced annual monetary targets, too.   
Today’s discussion about monetary strategies raises an interesting puzzle. On one side of the debate,
macro economists continue to follow the tradition of Poole (1970) and analyze the performance of alternative
monetary strategies in the framework of stochastic macro models; see e.g. Svensson (1997, 1998). They regard
the choice of a monetary strategy as part of an optimal control problem that depends on issues such as the
stability of the demand for money and the relative variances of shocks to the real and the financial sector. On
the other side of the debate, central bankers have noted that the close similarity in the use of central bank
instruments and the reaction of central banks to news and shocks under inflation forecast and monetary
targeting, suggesting that strategy choice does not seem to matter much for the day-to-day conduct of monetary
policy; see e.g. Freedman (1996), King (1996). In the same vein, Clarida and Gertler (1996), Bernanke and
Mihov (1997), and Mishkin (1998) argue that the Bundesbank’s conduct of monetary policy looks much like
what one would expect under an inflation target. Furthermore,  Groeneveld et al. (1996) point out that the
adoption of inflation targeting seems to have made little if any difference for empirical inflation and interest
rate dynamics. Almeida and Goodhart (1996) find no significant change in the conduct of interest rate policies
of six inflation-targeting central banks. Do monetary policy strategies not matter after all? 
 A simple answer is that central banks in practice do not adhere to “pure” strategies (Svensson, 1998),
or that central banks do what central banks do, no matter what label they use for their monetary policy
orientation. A more sophisticated explanation notes the difference between an open -loop monetary policy
strategy, i.e., one that fixes an intermediate  target during a given control period - a year in the case of annual
monetary or inflation forecast targets -  with no regard to incoming information during that period, and a closed
- loop strategy that continuously revises the intermediate target based on incoming information to achieve better2
control over the ultimate targets of monetary policy. While macro economic models of monetary policy
strategies typically assume open-loop strategies, monetary policy in practice seems to rely on closed-loop
strategies. As we show in section 2, admitting closed-loop strategies indeed implies that central bank behavior
is similar under different strategies and that the performance of monetary strategies in terms of the target
variables of monetary policy becomes very similar, provided that the ultimate goals of monetary policy are the
same.
This raises the question why central banks do make efforts to identify their monetary strategy. The
answer we develop in this paper focuses on political economy. Our analysis deviates from the conventional 
analysis of monetary strategies in two regards. One, we emphasize that central banks are no unified actors.
Instead, decisions over monetary policy decision involve many different individuals with different preferences
and different views of the economy. Two, we emphasize that many of the shocks central banks face are not
exogenous but rather the result of deliberate actions of other actors in the economic policy game. Central banks
can use monetary strategies to structure internal decision making problems and to shape the form of the policy
conflict with other actors. To make this point, we review in section III the introduction of monetary targeting by
the Bundesbank in the mid-1970s. In section IV, we broaden the perspective to discuss some implications for
the monetary strategy of the ECB.
  One implication of the political economy view of monetary strategies is that the choice of a monetary
strategy at a particular point in time depends largely on the particular decision making and strategic problems
the central bank faces at that point both internally and vis-à-vis other actors in the economic policy game. That
is, the choice of monetary strategy is highly path-dependent. Path-dependence is indeed suggested by observing
the evolution of monetary strategies in the past 30 years.  Argy et al. (1990) note that monetary targets were
adopted in the G7 after a period of high inflation combined with high and volatile money growth and large
fiscal expansions, and after loosing the exchange rate as the anchor of monetary policy at the end of the
Bretton-Woods regime. Almeida and Goodhart (1996) and Debelle (1997) point out that inflation targeting was
adopted by countries which had earlier experienced failures with exchange rate or monetary targets, and again
after a period of high inflation rates. These observations suggest that strategy choices of central banks tend to
be similar when they share a common experience of policy failure.
II. Observational Similarity of Closed-Loop Monetary Strategies yt￿1 
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Monetary policy strategies are typically discussed within the framework of the Tinbergen policy
paradigm. Accordingly, a central bank wishes to achieve a certain target value  y    for its target variable y
*
during a given period, t+1.  This is expressed by assuming that the central bank seeks to maximize the expected
1
value of a quadratic objective function in the deviations of y  from y . The central bank controls some t+1
*
instrument r. To emphasize the fact that the transmission of monetary policy to the target variable involves t
some lags, we assume that the target variable is related to the instrument and a set of other variables x through a
dynamic linear model. This model bears various representations which are the basis for designing monetary
strategies. All variables below are defined as averages over a time period of given length.
Consider first a strategy of direct targeting. Such a strategy starts from a final-form representation of
the model for the target variable which links the target variable y  to the instrument in period t and a vector of t+1
past observations of other variables, x , t-1
where u  is a random error whose expectation conditional on information available at the end of period t-1, t+1
E(u |I ) = 0. Maximizing the expected value of the objective function leads to the instrument rule: t+1 t-1
The direct strategy implies  a control error of u .  t+1
Under an intermediate target strategy, the central bank uses a representation of the model that relates
the target variable to an intermediate target variable z, an element of the vector x that is observable during the t
control period t and can be controlled with the central bank instrument r. Note that z can be a synthetic
variable, i.e., one composed of several economic variables, such as an inflation forecast derived from a number
of inputs (e.g., Svensson, 1998). The representation of the model used now has two parts, one linking the target
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Comparing (3) and (2), we note that ￿  =  u  - ￿  ￿  and ￿ = ￿￿.
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As Poole and the subsequent literature show, this variance depends on the variance of the shocks and
3






Here, ￿ ’ is defined as the vector ￿ whose element multiplying z has been set to zero.  The open-loop version of z
2
such a strategy first derives a target value for the intermediate target at the start of period t:
During the period, the central bank then sets its instrument such that z = z  is maintained: tt
*
Equation (5) shows that the intermediate target strategy allows the central bank implicitly to react to the
unobserved random shock ￿  that occurs during the control period. In this regard, it is informationally more z,t
efficient than the direct strategy. The open-loop strategy leaves a control error ￿  =  u -  E ( u|  I,  ￿ ) with z,t+1 t+1 t+1 t-1 z,t
regard to the target variable.
Now assume that there is an alternative representation of the model for the target variable, one that
links the target to an alternative intermediate target, w: t
where the coefficients and the residual are defined appropriately. Going through the same steps as before, the
instrument rule becomes:
and the control error with regard to the target becomes ￿  =  u -  E ( u|  I,   ￿). Obviously, the outcomes of w,t+1 t+1 t+1 t-1 w,t
the two intermediate target strategies are different, because the two intermediate targets have different
information content for the target variable. Equations (3) - (7) summarize the essence of the Poole (1970)
problem of choosing an intermediate target variable. It consists of comparing the two open-loop control errors







E (  z , t ￿ 1|  w , t 1 ,  w , t 2 , ..., w,ti)) ,
In addition, the central bank can use other variables that are observable during the control
4
period to extract further information about the control error u . We do not explore this point here as it t+1
adds nothing to the conclusions.
Obviously, the case where new information arrives that suggests that the central bank should
5
tolerate a deviation of z from z  with no change in r is a special case of this. tt t
*
Leroy and Waud (1977) demonstrate the empirical implementation of a similar updating
6
procedure within a Kalman-filtering approach.
5
(8)
But the information structure of the problem implies that the central bank can improve on either one of
the two strategies. Specifically, once it has set its instrument to the target value under the z-strategy at the start
of period t, the central bank can observe the development of the other variable, w, and obtain an observation of t
the current random shock, ￿ . Similarly, under a w-strategy it can observe z and derive the shock ￿ . Since w,t z,t
these shocks are correlated with u , the central bank can use this information to revise its initial intermediate t+1
target as the observation becomes available.  Former Bundesbank president Helmut Schlesinger (1988, p. 6)
4
describes this practice of in-period revision of the intermediate target: “the Bundesbank has never, since 1975,
conducted a rigid policy geared at the money supply alone; all available information about financial markets
and the development of the economy must be analyzed regularly.”
Thus, the central bank receives new information relevant to its forecast of  y  during the period and  t+1
reacts to such information. This can be interpreted as a revision of the intermediate target during the control
period, and an adjustment of the instrument r to achieve the revised intermediate target.  Thus, let t, 1,...,n, be a
5
i
subunit of the control period, and let ￿  be the observation of ￿  during that time period.  The revision of the w,ti w
6
intermediate target in subperiod i is 
where, for simplicity, we assume that the elasticity of y with regard to within-period changes of the t+1 
intermediate target is ￿  . The control error with regard to the target variable from this closed loop version of z
the z-strategy after n adjustments becomes  u  - E(u | I , ￿ , ￿  ￿ ...,￿ ), which, for large n, or t+1 t+1 t-1 z,t w,t1, w,t2, w,tn
frequent revisions, approximates u  - E(u | I , ￿ , ￿  ). It is straightforward to show that, by the law of t+1 t+1 t-1 z,t w,t
iterated projections, the same error is obtained from a closed loop version of the w - strategy. 
Thus, from an optimal control point of view, the performance of the monetary strategies is similar
provided that they use the same information sets, pursue the same objective, and the central bank is willing and
able to react to information arriving during the control period.   The following two sections draw on material presented in von Hagen (1998). While the
7
Bundesbank granted access to its archives for the purposes of this study, legal regulations prohibit
references to exact dates and names from the records used in this research.
6
III. Money Growth Targeting in Germany
7
The similarity of alternative monetary strategies under closed-loop strategies raises the question why
central banks stress the importance of one strategy over another. In this section, we argue that intermediate
target strategies are important for the central bank as an organization, because they can help solving several
coordination problems. To make this point, we review the experience of the Bundesbank’s introduction of
money growth targeting in 1974 as an illustration.
III.1. The Economic Background in 1974
Germany’s economy in the early 1970s was in a macroeconomic disequilibrium characterized by
inflationary pressures and the inability of monetary policy to fight them due to the restrictions of the fixed
exchange rate. Inflation, as measured by the GDP deflator, reached eight percent - one percent above the
OECD average - in 1970 and 1971 despite a relative weak economy; it slowed down to five percent in 1972
only to accelerate again to seven percent. Inflation was fueled by aggressive wage demands of the German
unions , which were sustained by an explicit guarantee for full employment promised by the Brandt
government
A rapid expansion of government spending, which rose from 38.5 percent of GDP in 1970 to 48.6
percent in 1975 contributed to the inflationary pressures. Despite an  overheated economy, the fiscal impulse as
calculated by the German Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) was positive and large in 1970, 1971, and
1972. Following the 1966 recession, the German government had vested itself with new fiscal policy tools and
given fiscal policy the leading role in macroeconomic stabilization. Fiscal policy had indeed been prominent in
the stabilization package of 1967. As fiscal policy was much less subject to external constraints than monetary
policy, the combat against inflation in the early 1970s should have come through a fiscal contraction. Finance
minister Möller recognized this necessity, but was unable to get his proposals for spending cuts passed by the
cabinet. Möller resigned over the issue in May 1971. His successor Schiller also tried to make the government
adopt a more disciplined fiscal stance; Schiller resigned in 1972 realizing his political inability to achieve this. 
In September 1972, Schiller’s successor Schmidt argued that the fight against inflation did not justifyThe Council of Economic Advisors (Report 1972/73, para 329sqq.) Supported this demand
8
arguing that fiscal policy had failed as an instrument for  stabilization.
Discount credit was supplied at a below-market interest rate but under a rationing scheme
9
giving each bank an individual discount quota.  
7
cutting back or postponing government programs of high importance for society. In his view, fiscal stabilization
was possible only by raising taxes. Thus, the dilemma of fiscal stabilization was fully apparent: In times of
recession, it was easy for the government to spend more, but  it was politically impossible to cut spending
during a boom. In view of this difficulty, the government, in a declaration of 18 January 1973, demanded that
monetary policy take the leading role in the short-run stabilization of the economy.
8
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Monetary policy was caught by necessity to fix the DM’s dollar exchange rate in the face of strong
pressures for an appreciation. As the Bundesbank’s Report for 1970 (p. 22) stated, the external constraint kept 
the Bank from stopping the rise in domestic demand by a monetary contraction.  Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this.
Figure 1 shows the high and rising money growth rates reaching almost 15 percent in 1971 - 72. Figure 2
shows  the repeated cuts in German interest rates following the Fed’s lead even in the face of rising inflation
rates. In the course of 1971 and 1972, the Bundesbank tried various capital and exchange restrictions - which it
had to demand from the federal government - to contain capital inflows and tighten its policy relative to the US.
But these attempts did not succeed for long. Each time, “the dike broke” as a Bundesbank Council member put
it, forcing the Bank to adjust its rates downwards. The Bank had, as one central banker stated in a Council
meeting, lost control over the money supply. 
At the same time, the Bank’s paradigm of monetary control evidently failed (Schlesinger, 1979). The
cornerstone of this paradigm was the assumption of a stable “liquid reserves ratio (LRR).” “Liquid reserves”
consisted of central bank money held by commercial banks less required reserves.  In the early 1970s, short-
term treasury bills issued by the Bundesbank with an unconditional buy-back guarantee, unused discount loan
quota , and short-term dollar assets were considered perfect substitutes for central bank reserves and were
9
counted as liquid reserves, too, as commercial banks could turn these into actual reserves at any point in timeThis decline was due to the development of an interbank market and changing banking
10
regulation in Germany; cf. the Bank’s Annual Report for 1973, p. 3, and the Council of Economic
Advisors’ Report for 1973-74, para 172.
8
on their own initiative. The LRR was taken with regard to bank deposits. According to the LRR hypothesis,
banks aimed at a stable LRR over time, implying that money growth would be preceded by a rising LRR.
However, the expansion of the money supply in the early 1970s was preceded by a drop in the LRR from an
average of 11.6 percent in 1969 to an average of 6.8 percent in 1970 and 6.0 percent in 1972.  
10
Under the LRR approach, required reserves ratios were the Bundesbank’s main instrument for short-
run monetary control. Raising or cutting these ratios could turn liquid into required reserves and thus destroy or
create liquid reserves immediately. Beyond that, the Bank’s instruments consisted only of lending to
commercial banks under automatic-access facilities (discount and Lombard credit), offering short-term paper at
preset interest rates, and foreign exchange market interventions.  Importantly, these instruments left the
initiative for creating central money largely with the banking system. Bundesbank Council members were often
frustrated by the impression that they had much less control over central bank money growth than the banking
industry. One indication of this frustration is the frequent description of the Bank as a “self-service store for
central bank money” used in Council meetings in the early 1970s.  
III.2. Regaining Monetary Control
In the first months of 1973, the DM came under renewed pressures for appreciation, forcing the
Bundesbank to undertake massive interventions in the foreign exchange market. In early February, the Bank
recommended closing-down the foreign exchange market to the federal government. Instead, the government
tightened administrative controls against capital inflows, arguing that it was important to find a “European”
solution to the dollar problem, i.e., one that would be supported by France and England. Yet, the dollar crisis
became more and more acute. During February alone, foreign exchange inflows amounted to some 15 percent
of the monetary base. On 1 March 1973, the Bundesbank was forced to buy dollars in the equivalent of DM 2.7
billion or three percent of the monetary base. Once again, the Bundesbank asked the federal government to
close the markets. This was done on 2 March. When the markets reopened on 19 March, the fixed exchange
rate had been suspended indefinitely.
Freed from the external constraint, members of the Bundesbank Council held very diverse views on the Börsenzeitung 22. 9. 1972
11




 future approach to monetary policy. Several members favored administrative controls of credit creation, such
as a minimum reserve held against bank loans and the imposition of quantitative loan limits on commercial
banks (Annual Report, 1972, 28). While the CEA (Report 1972/73, para 397sqq.) warned against embarking
on such a path towards rigid economic planning, finance minister Schmidt signaled his sympathy for the
approach, although he argued that such far-reaching administrative interventions should be reserved for times
of crisis.  The Bank’s proposal for a revised Bundesbank Act in 1973 indeed contained provisions for both
11
instruments, and both were included in the finance ministry’s draft bill. Schmidt, however, insisted that
quantitative loan limits could only come under a shared responsibility of the Bundesbank and his department; a
condition that would obviously have undermined the Bank’s autonomy over monetary policy. When the
Council realized this, even members that had advocated this approach recommended not to pursue it any
further. 
In a discussion about the options for monetary control in January 1973, the Council considered two
alternatives to the quantitative loan limits: a required LRR, and direct control of the central bank money supply.
The required LRR was rejected in view of the instability of this ratio in recent years. It was argued that direct
control over central bank money foremostly required abolishing all mechanisms granting banks automatic
access to central bank money, i.e., reducing liquid reserves to zero.  Members of the Bank’s Board and staff
were confident that the central bank money stock could be controlled with reasonable precision if this were
achieved.  The suspension of foreign exchange interventions together with the results of various previous
12
measures implied that this condition was suddenly and quite unexpectedly fulfilled in March 1973. The
decision to conduct monetary policy on the basis of controlling base money had, in effect, been taken by
happenstance. 
The Bank immediately used its new scope for monetary policy to embark on a restrictive course. In a
significant break with its own past, it refrained from creating new LR, keeping the LRR close to zero (see
figure 2). The steep rise in interbank rates (figure 2) illustrates the tightness of the new monetary policy.
Proposals came from some Council members to ease money market conditions, but were rejected on the
grounds that it was essential to abolish all channels of automatic access to central bank money for the bankingAn internal memorandum later argued that the Bundesbank’s determined abolition of
13
automatic access to central bank money for commercial banks was a very visible change in its policy
and the essential precondition for the success of the intended monetary restriction.
“Die Bundesbank spielt mit dem Feuer”, Handelsblatt 27 July 1973
14
10
sector. In May 1973, the Bank increased its discount rate twice. The reasoning on the Council was that the
banking industry’s expectation of easy and automatic access to central bank money had to be shattered
permanently. In late May, the Bundesbank replaced its Lombard credit with “special Lombard,” which the
Bank could suspend unilaterally.  A steep rise in the volatility of overnight rates and in the Frankfurt interbank
13
spread of rates, which climbed to 13 percent in March, 28 percent in April and 33 percent in August, illustrate
that the new policy took a banking industry which had been used to be able to obtain central bank reserves
when needed by surprise. Soon, the Bank was criticized for endangering the stability of the whole banking
sector by leaving banks with insufficient reserves.
14
Figure 1 shows that the intended deceleration of money growth began to show starting in mid-1973. In
this sense, the direct control of  central bank money  was a success. But the new approach was confronted with
difficulties. On the one hand, the Bundesbank either had to be ready to supply and absorb liquidity quickly
when demand peaked or able to forecast the liquidity demand of the banking sector correctly, if it wanted to
control the quantity of central bank money directly but avoid large gyrations of money market rates. The former
would have required more flexible and larger open market operations than the Bank deemed desirable in the
narrow government bond market. The latter proved technically exceedingly difficult. 
On the other hand, Council and staff members of the Bank saw a contradiction between the Bank’s
required reserves system and a rigid quantitative control of base money. The reserve requirement was based on
lagged deposits, which made the demand for reserves largely exogenous towards the end of the month. Critics
deemed it inappropriate for the Bank to require banks to hold a certain amount of reserves without assuring that
this requirement could be met in principle, i.e., in the aggregate at least. Given that deposit flows could be
volatile and largely unexpected at the level of the individual bank, they argued that violating the reserve
requirement was not always the result of improper bank management. With reserves demand being exogenous,
the Bank would have to adjust the supply of reserves to avoid large swings in short term interest rates.  But an
unconditional readiness to serve the banking sector’s demand for reserves obviously undermined the control of
base money.11
The solution to these problems lay in renouncing the direct, short-run control of base money and focus
on its medium-run growth. In June 1973, a memo to the Council argued that monetary policy should aim at a
medium-run growth target for the money supply and  accommodate seasonal and short-run peaks in the banks’
demand for reserves. This would still enable the Bank to reach its real intention of  keeping money growth in
line with the growth of the economy. Such a medium-run oriented control could be achieved by controlling the
“price” of central bank money, i.e., the Bundesbank’s lending conditions. Raising the cost of refinancing at the
central bank would cause banks to curtail lending, which in turn would reduce their demand for base money.
Following this proposal established the Bundesbank’s approach of controlling base money “via the interest rate
channel” (Mainert, 1974; Dudler, 1983). In subsequent years, the overnight interbank rate, seen  as a summary
statistic of the Bank’s lending conditions, became the focus of short-run central bank operations.
Still, there were conflicting interpretions of the new approach. The Bank’s Annual Report 1973 (p. 4),
like the CEA’s Report 1973/74 (para 170, 292) talked about an “immediate control of base money”. This view 
met opposition within the Bank for three reasons: First, because of the contradiction to the required reserve
system discussed above. Second, because targeting the monetary base raised the question of an appropriate base
money target, which could not be answered easily. Third, because there were calls inside and outside the Bank
for targeting a nonbank aggregate. Significantly, the European Council had recommended in 1972 that the
member states’ central banks adopt such targets. 
Targeting money, however, raised the question of the appropriate target aggregate. With the steep rise
in short-term interest rates, M1 grew much more slowly during 1973 than the broader M2 (M1 plus time
deposits) or M3 (M2 plus savings deposits), raising doubts about the appropriateness of any of these for
monetary targeting. Furthermore, nonbank aggregates were available only on an end-of-month basis, implying a
much higher volatility than base money, for which monthly averages of daily data were available. In late 1973,
a staff member of the Bank found an ingenious solution to this problem. Referring to a new academic literature,
he argued that only an aggregate that weighted deposits according to their maturities would avoid the statistical
biases simple-sum aggregates showed in times of rising or falling interest rates. Assuming that required reserve
ratios proximately reflected liquidity degrees of deposits, these ratios were the appropriate as weights. This led
to the definition of  the Bundesbank’s “central bank money stock” (CBM) consisting of currency in circulation
plus deposits weighted by required reserve ratios as of 1974. Given that excess reserves held by banks were
negligible, the new aggregate was, of course, identical to the monetary base, as long as required reserve ratiosInternal memoranda of the Bundesbank show that the staff had used CBM already since 1971
15
for analytical purposes. It is noteworthy that the proponent of CBM recognized the arbitrariness of
assuming that required reserves ratios equaled relative liquidity degrees and the fact that CBM gave an
excessive weight to currency in circulation. The latter, in fact, and the volatility of currency demand in




would not deviate too much from their 1974 levels.  The ingenuity of the proposal was that it made targeting
15
CBM acceptable both for those members of the Council who favored the immediate control of base money and
for those who favored targeting a non-bank aggregate, and that it corresponded pretty much to the “monetary
control with zero liquid reserves” the Bundesbank had practiced since March 1973 anyway.
 
III.3. Monetary Targeting
By 1974, the general economic picture had changed in Germany. The tight monetary policy pushed the
economy towards recession, soon amplified by the oil price shocks.  While inflation showed first signs to slow
16
down, unemployment moved to the forefront of economic policy.  In its 1974 Report, the CEA  criticized the
Bundesbank for not sufficiently clarifying its policy intentions to the public, arguing that the sudden
contraction had contributed unduly to the rise in unemployment. Schlesinger (1983, p. 6), the Bank’s chief
economist, later acknowledged that unions and enterprises had underestimated the Bank’s determination to
fight inflation in 1973, the expectations error resulting in higher unemployment. The CEA demanded a more
transparent monetary policy orientation and proposed announcing  a target for money growth, primarily  to
provide some orientation for unions and employers in their wage negotiations. The federal government adopted
the idea by making a money growth target for CBM part of its stabilization program of late 1974. 
Two questions were occupying the Bundesbank Council in the second half of 1974: One, what should
be the future monetary policy strategy as the immediate fight against excessive money growth and inflation was
showing success, and, two, how should the Bank react to the weakening economy. One group of  Council
members argued for a more expansionary monetary policy to increase output and employment. In mid-1974
already, a majority was favorably inclined to respond to the demands for an easier monetary policy, which were
also voiced by the CEA (Report 1974/75, para 246) and the main economic research institutes. To avoid a rise
in inflation expectations, however, such a move had to be moderate, and the Bundesbank would have to find a
way to assure the public that it did not mean a return to the high inflation rates of the recent past. TheseSee Bockelmann (1989).
17
Used until 1982, the concept of an “unavoidable” inflation rate for the next year was used to
18
indicate the level of inflation that could not be influenced by current monetary policy. 
13
members found the proposal of a monetary target a convenient way to communicate to public that the
Bundesbank still intended to keep a check on monetary expansion. Some Council members also argued that a
monetary target, once announced to the public, would create a first line of defense against demands for further
monetary easing from the political sector should the desired economic upswing fail to come. 
Opposing the concept of an active monetary stabilization policy, another group of Council members,
led by Emminger, the vice-president of the Bank, and Schlesinger, demanded that the Bank liberate itself from
short-run stabilization objectives and pursue a “steady” course of monetary policy primarily geared at price
stability.  Some Council members complained that the Bundesbank was taking up too many responsibilities in
stabilization, and that its policy had become intransparent and incoherent as a result. From their point of view,
the concept of a monetary target was attractive because of its consistency with the framework of controlling the
medium-run growth of CBM. They argued that money should grow in line with potential output, yielding a low
rate of inflation on average over the medium run. In fact, this concept was already implicit in the Annual
Report of 1973, which argued (p. 45) that “as in 1973, the Bundesbank will, in 1974, endeavor to steer CBM
such that the volume of money and credit can expand to an extent compatible with a stable growth of the
economy.”  
17
The circumstances in late 1974 thus were such that both proponents and critics of an active monetary
stabilization policy in the Council found  the announcement of a monetary target for 1975 attractive, albeit for
very different reasons. The numerology of the particular target proposed, an annual growth rate of eight
percent, underscores the coincidence of the compromise: With six percent annual CBM growth in 1974, eight
percent were conceived as the announcement of a moderate easing of monetary policy. Given a predicted  real
growth rate of two and an inflation rate of six percent, a CBM target of eight percent could also be interpreted
as a “neutral” stance of monetary policy. Finally, potential output was expected to grow at three percent in
1975 and the “unavoidable” inflation rate at five percent.  Hence the particular target of eight percent was
18
agreeable to Council members pushing for a monetary expansion, a neutral stance, and a more steady course ofSome Council members were concerned that the publication of the monetary target would
19
impose artificial restrictions on the Bank’s ability to react flexibly to cyclical shocks and demanded
that the monetary targets remained adjustable in the short run. Others doubted the ability to control the
money supply and to predict the relationship between nominal output and money with sufficient
precision. A compromise was found by arguing in the published announcement, that a strong
correlation between output and money growth did not exist in the short run and that the target rate of
eight percent seemed adequate only from “today’s perspective”. This would leave the Bank sufficient
room for discretion.
14
monetary policy. As such, it was adopted almost unanimously.
19
On 19 December 1974, immediately after the decision to adopt and publish a monetary target, the
Bundesbank Council decided to lower the discount rate, contemporaneously with the announcement by the
federal government of a program to stimulate output growth. Several further cuts in the discount rate followed,
all motivated by the intention to revive the sluggish economy. Critics of this course argued during the Council
meetings that the monetary target demanded the orientation of monetary policy at more long-term
developments. However, their position was weakened by the fact that CBM growth itself slowed down in the
Spring of 1975. Only later in the year money growth recuperated; in the end the target was overshot by two
percent. 
The years of 1976 and 1977 repeated the experience. Some members of the Council continued to
demand “steady” orientation of monetary policy; others replied that the Council could not simply ignore the
short-run effects of monetary actions, and that a large degree of flexibility was precisely the advantage of
monetary policy as a tool to steer the economy. Each year, measures to slow down money growth were taken
too late for fear of negative effects on the fledgling economic recovery. Nevertheless, in view of the public’s
positive response to the new concept and reasoning that it was too early to abandon the experiment, the Council
each year followed Schlesinger’s proposal to adopt a monetary target of eight percent, though there were some
slight modifications in the target formulation .
The CEA, in its Report for 1974/75 (para 394) recommended that monetary policy should adopt a
“neutral” stance with regard to the business cycle, letting money grow at the rate of potential output growth and
the “unavoidable” inflation rate. In the years following the first monetary target, however, the Bundesbank did
not adopt such an orientation. Instead, its monetary target was explicitly imbedded in the federal government’s
general economic perspective for the following year. The Annual Report of 1976 (p. 23), for example, argued
that “The Bundesbank and the federal government aim at a real growth rate of five percent.” The Report for
1977 defines “strong economic growth and a further containment of inflation” as the goals of monetary policy.CPI inflation was flat around 3.6 percent in 1977 and resumed its decline in 1978 due to the
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weakening of the dollar. However, inflation measured by  the GDP deflator increased by 3.7 percent in
1977 and by 4.3 percent in 1978, up from 3.6 percent in 1976. 
15
Obviously, soon after the first success in the fight against inflation, active stabilization had regained importance
in the Bank’s policy orientation relative to price stability and a steady course of monetary policy.
III.4. Crisis and Survival of Monetary Targeting
The conflict over monetary targeting in the Council became more acute in late 1977, after the third
overshooting of the monetary target in a row and in view of a re-emergence of inflation (see figure 2).  The
20
proponents of a “steady” monetary policy criticized that it was time to end the period of experimentation with
monetary targets. While the public had responded positively to the new approach, the Bundesbank had to ask
itself how seriously it wanted to take its monetary target. These Council members demanded a stronger role of
the monetary target to guide council decisions. But a leading Council member took a strong position against
this, arguing that monetary targeting was a questionable concept. In his view, an “interest rate” policy would
have delivered better results in 1977. He found the idea that the Bank could avoid political pressures by basing
its decisions on objective data dubious. Instead, he claimed that the Bank had such a strong position in the
public opinion that it could make decisions even against political pressure.
Furthermore, this member demanded that the Bundesbank Council should not narrow its mandate
unduly to the setting of a monetary target and give up the possibility of making discretionary decisions.
Another leading member supported this view arguing that the Council should under no circumstances make
itself a slave of a mere number. If the Council did, in the end, adopt a monetary target for 1978, this was mainly
due to the consideration that, not unlike 1974, it intended an easing of monetary policy for external and cyclical
reasons, and feared that a reduction of the discount rate without announcing a monetary target might have
created the impression that the Bundesbank had left its steady course and would have fueled inflation
expectations. Thus, the Bank’ Report for 1977 (p. 20sqq) emphasized that missing the monetary target in 1977
did not indicate that the Bank had given up its stability-oriented monetary policy, and that the new target for
1978 demonstrated  the continuation of this course.
Already in the Spring of 1978, however, money growth was too fast for achieving the target. This was
partly the result of large foreign exchange inflows as the dollar weakened rapidly. Early in June, the CouncilThen Bundesbank president Emminger suggests that monetary targeting would almost have
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been adopted at that point. See Emminger (1986)
see Fratianni and von Hagen (1992) for a description and analysis of the EMS.
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discussed a suspension of the monetary target.  In the end, it feared that a suspension or revision of the
21
monetary target would undermine the Bank’s credibility and preferred a public statement that the overshooting
was to the external pressures (Monthly Report July 1978, p. 5sq.). In the debate, Council members emphasized
that the deviation from the monetary target could be limited should economic growth pick up and inflation
revive. This scenario did in fact emerge in the second half of 1978.
On the external front of monetary policy, the years from 1974 to 1977 had seen repeated crises in the
“Snake”, the European post-Bretton Woods exchange rate arrangement. Following the realignments of 1977,
there were increasing demands for a reform of the system. Such reforms should facilitate a lasting participation
of France and should make the system less centered on the DM and more symmetric, instead.  More symmetry,
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in this context, could only mean that the Bundesbank would have to lend greater support for the weaker partner
currencies and thus follow the more inflationary policies of their central banks, an obvious infringement of its
independence. In July 1978, the German chancellor Schmidt and the French president Giscard d’Estaign
launched their initiative for the “European Monetary System” which was to meet these demands. It was
formally adopted in December and started operating in March 1979. An important consequence of the event
was that it shifted the balance on the Bundesbank Council in favor of maintaining the monetary target.
In its debate over the monetary target for 1979 several members of the Bundesbank Council were
decidedly in favor of  abandoning the strategy. They argued that the monetary target was not taken seriously
neither within nor outside the Bank, instead, the repeated violations of the target had made the Bank a laughing
stock to the observer. Other members, however, raised important reasons for keeping the monetary target. One
was the visible revival of inflation. They thought that a monetary target would make it easier to pursue a
restrictive course of monetary policy in the following years. The other reason, stressed by many Council
members, was that abandoning monetary targeting at the time when the new EMS was beginning to operate
would create the impression that the Bank was giving up on its efforts to maintain price stability, and that this
would fuel inflation expectations. Remarkably, even the leading Council member who had strongly opposed
monetary targeting the year before, supported the strategy now, referring also to the high reputation the strategy
had gained the Bank abroad. A federal government representative attending the Council meeting argued that17
the Bank should keep its strategy, because the start of the EMS made a public demonstration of its
compatibility with a stringent stability-oriented monetary policy both to the partner central banks and the public
very important. In the end, the Council adopted a target for 1979 almost unanimously; the target was
announced as a corridor of two percent to gain some flexibility for responding to the pressures from the EMS.
III.5. Monetary Targeting: A Political Economy Perspective
The review of the Bundesbank’s adoption of monetary targeting reveals several motivations for such a
strategy choice. Poole-type arguments play almost no role among them. Although the Bundesbank Council
discussed the controllability of the money supply and the link between money and nominal output growth as
preconditions for monetary targeting, the Poole-question, namely what is the dominant source of shocks in the
economy, was not discussed when monetary targeting was adopted. 
III.5.1. Marking the Beginning of a New Regime
A first important motive was certainly that controlling and targeting money emphasized the difference
between the Bretton Woods regime and the new regime that had begun in 1973. The loss of control over money
creation had been the main problem prior to 1973. For the Bundesbank, whose legal mandate is to control the
economy’s supply of money and credit, losing the technical ability fulfill this task had to be an existential crisis.
The fact that Vice-president Emminger (1976, 523) called  the international financial markets a “rival monetary
government” (‘monetäre Nebenregierung’) leading to “intolerable” imported inflation and currency crises
shows that the Bank saw the loss of monetary control not only as a threat to monetary stability but also to its
own institutional identity (Giersch 1980, 54). Emminger asserted that the end of the fixed-rate system served
primarily to “regain sovereign control over our money supply” (‘Wiedergewinnung der Herrschaft über die
eigene Geldversorgung’ 1976, p. 532, 540). The announcement of a monetary target was, therefore, a strong
assertion that the Bank had regained control over its essential variable and that it was now able to use monetary
policy to achieve its domestic policy goals. In the same vein, it underscored the Bank’s determination not to
allow commercial banks access to channels of automatic money creation, as before. 
From this perspective, it is easily understood that the Bank maintained its monetary target despite 
massive internal criticism, when its authority over domestic monetary policy was threatened again by the
imposition of the European Monetary System. Even harsh critics within the Bank were ready to support the18
strategy as a clear signal that the Bank was not about to give up control over its essential variable again in favor
of a  more “symmetric” exchange rate system. 
But note that the signal was set not at the beginning of the new regime. Signaling theories of monetary
strategies (Canzoneri, 1985) suggest that the Bank should have adopted a target in 1973 or 1974 to reveal its
new stance of monetary policy and guide expectations towards lower inflation. Instead, the signal was set when
inflation had already slowed down and the Bank was ready to give output and employment greater weight in its
policy again. That is, the signal was used when the priorities of monetary policy were beginning to become
more ambiguous than in the immediate post-Bretton Woods period. In this regard, the adoption of monetary
targeting resembles the adoption of inflation targets in several countries in recent years (Debelle, 1997).
III.5.2. Defining the Role of Monetary Policy
Another important motivation for monetary targeting was that it defined and clarified the role of
monetary policy in the context of macro economic policies in general. As discussed above, the early 1970s
revealed the political inability of the government to deliver a fiscal contraction when this was required to macro
stabilization. When the government called upon monetary policy to take the leading role in this regard,
members of the Bundesbank Council feared that accepting this call would make the goals of monetary policy
exceedingly complex and ambitious. Aiming at price stability, full employment and output growth
simultaneously, monetary policy would degenerate to short-run oriented activism with no clear long-run
orientation. 
 The CEA, in its Report for 1972/73 (paras, 329sqq.) joined the federal government in demanding a
more active role of monetary policy and argued that the latter should be primarily geared at fighting inflation.
But monetary stabilization policy was faced with two difficulties. On the one hand, a continued fiscal
expansion - the fiscal impulse remained large and positive in most years after 1973 - necessarily brought a
price-stability oriented monetary policy in conflict with fiscal policy, and it was not clear whether the Bank
could maintain its course in such a conflict. On the other hand, responding to the continued wage pressures
with a restrictive monetary policy would bring monetary policy in conflict with the labor unions, and have
negative employment effects that would work against the full-employment guarantee promised by the federal
government. In view of these difficulties, the Bundesbank Council was reluctant to accept the responsibility for
macro economic stabilization, arguing that the central bank was unable to fight inflationary pressures comingSchlesinger (1974, 1979). The Council of Economic Advisors’ Report for 1971/72 (para 64)
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explains that employers were used to accept high wage demands relying on the possibility to raise
prices later.
According to the Bundesbank Act, federal government representatives are allowed to
24
participate in Council meetings without a vote.
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from non-monetary sources. Some members of the Council even thought that monetary policy could no longer
play an active role in macroeconomic stabilization at all, as prices and output in their view were determined by
highly cartelized unions and firms. But it was clear that the Bank could not simply deny its role in macro
economic policy once it was liberated from the external constraints. Rather, the challenge was to define its role
properly.
Monetary targeting was a significant step in that direction. Although the Bank had declared the fight
against inflation as its principal goal of monetary policy in 1973 (Annual Report 1973, p. 45), the rise in
unemployment suggested that wage setters had not taken this declaration serious enough in 1973 and 1974.   In
view of this, an important purpose of the monetary target was to convey to unions and employers the
Bundesbank’s firm determination not to misuse monetary policy to undo the negative employment effects of
excessive wage settlements by higher inflation rates any more.  As Schlesinger (1979, p. 308) puts it 
23
“...monetary policy has no influence on whether or to what extent the monetary framework it has marked out is
used to expand output or to raise cost and prices. ...But as the monetary target tends to act as a signpost, the
pressure to exercise cost and price discipline is likely to grow. Indeed, experience even permits the conclusion
that the formulation of this target helped to bring about a ‘social consensus’ among all groups...” The general
perception of the German public, therefore, was that by announcing its monetary target the Bundesbank had
clarified the rules of the game: Monetary policy was no longer to be made responsible for employment. 
Significantly, the monetary target became the basis for a new assignment of responsibilities in macro
economic policy. In December 1973, a representative of the federal government attending a Council meeting
reported that a fiscal expansion was planned in view of the incipient recession.  Nevertheless, the government
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encouraged the Bank to maintain its restrictive course a little later, even if output was stagnating and
unemployment rising. Against the proposal of several Council members, the representative of the federal
government argued that the Bank should not throw the towel shortly before a break in the inflation trend had
been reached. If a critical situation should develop in the labor market, the federal government would
implement an appropriate employment program. In its Annual Report for 1974 the Bank described the newSee von Hagen (1995).
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assignment: monetary policy was primarily responsible for price stability, while the federal government’s task
was to alleviate structural weaknesses. The CEA (Report 1973/74) put it even more bluntly: Monetary policy
should take care of price stability, and fiscal policy of a sufficiently high level of employment. 
It must be noted in this context that the Bundesbank began to announce inflation targets together with
adopting monetary targeting, first a series of “unavoidable” inflation rates and, from 1984 on, a fixed rate of
two percent.  Thus, the monetary target was visibly backed up by a declaration about the intended goal of
25
monetary policy. The monetary target, however, was important in this context, because by pointing to the link
between inflation, output growth, and money growth it strengthened the focus of monetary policy on price
stability.
A second aspect of the Bundesbank’s definition of its role in the macro economic policy game was that
monetary targeting showed that the Bank accepted responsibility for inflation, but only for that part of inflation
that was due to monetary policy, namely excessive monetary expansion. Significantly, the Bundesbank never
announced a target inflation rate for a specific time horizon, as inflation forecast targeting banks do. Instead, it
declared that monetary policy aimed at a low rate of inflation “over the medium run”. This allowed the Bank to
refrain from counteracting each increase in the price level with a monetary restriction and emphasized that
monetary policy would not take responsibility for rises in the price level caused by the policies of other actors
in the economic policy game, while the fairly precise monetary target suggested that the Bank intended to keep
the monetary contribution to price level developments under close control. In particular, this meant that the
Bank would not feel compelled to counteract the inflation effects of a fiscal expansion or excessive wage
pressures. 
This aspect of monetary targeting became most evident in the post-unification period, 1990-92. For
example, the July 1991 Monthly Report argues (p. 17) that “the Bundesbank cannot prevent the price increase
caused by the rise in consumption taxes at mid-year. This increase will be on the order of one half of a
percent.”  Similarly, the 1992 Annual Report (p. 26) identifies increasing taxes and public sector user fees as a
main cause for the four-percent upwards shift in the price level, again implying that the Bundesbank would not 
try to undo this effect. In view of the incipient acceleration of the price level, the Bundesbank explained, in its 
Annual Report for 1991,  that "beyond the impact effects (of the rise in VAT), a cumulative process of priceyt 
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and wage increases must not begin" (p. 31), while the Monthly Report for February 1991 holds that “monetary
policy has the task of making sure that the price increases resulting from tax increases do not continue in an
inflationary process” (p. 8) and “the Bundesbank must do everything possible with her means to assure that the
current tendency for rising prices does not form the basis for permanently higher inflation expectations.” (p. 9).  
The important point here is that price level shocks, which, in macro economic models are typically
assumed to be exogenous, are in reality the outcome of the actions of other agents of economic policy. The
following example illustrates the point. Let % and y be the rates of inflation and output growth, respectively, m
the money growth rate, g the rate of fiscal expansion, and u a stochastic shock. Output growth is determined by
a rational expectations supply curve,  
where the superscript ‘e’ denotes an expectation, and inflation is given by
where b>0 is a parameter. Finally, assume that the government, who controls g, wishes to maximize 
where y >0 and  g  = G+￿ is the government’s target rate of fiscal expansion, which includes a political
**
tt
preference shock each period. Consider a monetary strategy that makes m react negatively to inflation, m = - t
￿% . In this case, the rate of fiscal expansion is  t
In contrast, when m is predetermined, the rate of fiscal expansion is 
(12) and (13) show that fiscal policy does more to stabilize the exogenous shock, u , when monetary policy t22
remains predetermined. Furthermore, the expected rate of fiscal expansion is smaller in that case, if ￿bG > 1,
and fiscal policy reacts less strongly to the fiscal preference shock, ￿.  Thus, by announcing a predetermined t
monetary policy, the central bank can induce fiscal policy to behave in a more disciplined way.
Ultimately, the Bundesbank’s willingness and ability to define its monetary policy goal in this way
witnesses the political independence of the Bank; only an independent Bank can define its own responsibility.
In this sense, monetary targeting also signaled the Bank’s independence. Interestingly, during a Council
discussion in late 1976, when some members criticized the concept of monetary targeting, representative of the
federal government encouraged the Council to hang on to its strategy because it resulted in a more steady
monetary policy and removed monetary policy from the daily business of economic policy, thus strengthening
the independence of the central bank.
III.5.3. Monetary Targets as Focal Points
  A third motivation for monetary targeting relates to the time horizon involved in this particular
strategy. In the context of monetary targeting, the central bank would use its instrument to steer an intermediate
target whose reactions to instrument changes could be expected to appear in the data with a lag of 2 - 3 months.
While a deviation of money growth from target implies an unambiguous direction where to move monetary
policy instruments, an assessment of the magnitude of such moves needs some time. Based on this reasoning,
the proponents of monetary targeting on the Council hoped that this strategy would remove monetary policy
from the daily attention of the media and thus relieve the Council from the need to take “spectacular” actions
repeatedly. 
Note that this is different from Blinder’s (1 987) and Goodhart’s (1998) interpretation of intermediate
targeting as an attempt to deflect political pressure from the central bank by  reducing monetary policy
decisions to “technicalities.”  In Blinder’s view, the Fed adopted monetary targeting primarily to shield itself
against the criticism of raising interest rates to excessive heights in its effort to combat inflation; the Fed would
respond to such criticism that it controlled money growth and that interest rates were determined by the market,
not monetary policy. Goodhart (1998) suggests that, given the inflation target set by the British Chancellor, the
inflation forecast helps deflect criticism against the Bank of England’s interest rate policy, as the Bank can only
be criticized for a flawed forecast or flawed assumptions about the time horizon over which interest rates affect
this forecast, both rather technical issues. As indicated above, critics of monetary targeting on the Bundesbank23
Council in 1977 rejected the view that the Bank could deflect criticism by hiding behind technical issues as an
illusion; there is not much evidence that this view played an important role in the adoption of monetary
targeting.  Monetary targets in Germany came when interest rates had already come down again. The purpose
here was to take the pressure of daily activism from the Bank and allow it to develop a more consistent strategy
of time, a “steady” course of monetary policy.
In fact, this motivation was as much directed to the inside of the Bank as to the outside. As the
historical review suggests, the Council at the time was split into a group favoring more activist policies and a
group favoring more long-term oriented policies. Born of a lucky compromise between these groups, as
described above, the monetary target became the focal point of the debate between these groups. Although not
a strict guideline, the monetary target and the comparison of actual money growth with it became a regular
topic in Council debates. In 1975 and 1976, Council members argued that the target had become a “healthy”
disciplining device, although the proponents of a “steady” monetary policy regularly demanded a greater role of
the monetary target as a guide for policy decisions. One leading member of the Council and proponent of the
strategy summarized the 1975 experience saying that the monetary target had helped the Bundesbank avoid a
“stop and go” policy of the kind observed in the Federal Reserve System. When, in the course of 1976,
considerations of short-run stabilization policy began to gain greater weight in the Council’s decisions again,
much of the debate focused again on the monetary target and its appropriate role in monetary policy decisions.
Repeatedly, Council members argued that missing the target again would damage the Bundesbank’s credibility.
In December of that year, a leading proponent of the strategy called into question the sense of a monetary target
if the Council did not take its implications sufficiently serious. But the fact that the Council maintained its
strategy indicates that the members were willing to some extent at least to accept the implication of a more
“steady” policy orientation. Furthermore, the fact that the Council repeatedly discussed the appropriate
definition of target and changed it e.g. from a year-end to an annual average target suggests that the members
felt bound by the target to some extent during the year. 
It is clear, nevertheless, that the power of the monetary target as a focal point was variable over time.
As one Council member judged later, the basic, medium-run orientation of monetary policy had been accepted
in principle, but this could not prevent short-run developments to gain importance occasionally. Excess money
growth would receive relatively less attention in Council meetings as long as the rate of inflation was kept in
check. The 1978 experience confirms that monetary targeting regained importance when inflation was back onIt also emphasized the independence of the Bundesbank from the federal government, which,
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At the same time, the review of monetary policy in the second half of the 1970s points to the strong
status-quo bias of Council decisions. One aspect of status-quo bias is that Council decisions were usually taken
with large majorities. In our context, the status-quo bias protected monetary targeting against its critics.
Repeatedly in 1975-77, members of the Council argued that it was not yet time to end the “experiment”, even
though the critics had their points against monetary targeting. Often, maintaining the strategy was justified by
reference to the positive echo it had received in the general public.  Facilitated by a coincidence of
circumstances, monetary targeting thus proved to be a stable institution once it had become the status quo. 
The monetary target served as a focal point in another aspect, too. The emphasis on the control of
money growth was a clear break with the option of administrative controls of credit creation or of imposing a
required liquid reserves ratio.   Among the Council members, monetary targeting cemented the decision in
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favor of conducting monetary policy on the basis of controlling base money creation by means of the Bank’s
interest rate instruments and required reserve ratios, and thus ended the debate over the basic approach of
Bundesbank monetary policy.  
In sum, monetary targeting served the Bundesbank a number of politico-economic functions: It marked
the end of the old regime where the Bank was powerless, it defined its monetary policy goal and its role in the
macro economic policy game, it was intended to discipline other actors in this game, and it served as a focal
point in council meetings, strengthening the pursuit of a consistent monetary policy geared at price stability
over time. Looking ahead at the European Central Bank, the questions determining its strategy choice then are,
what will be the main politico-economic difficulties facing the ECB and how can strategy formulation
contribute to solving them?
 
IV. Implications for the ECB
Preparatory work at the EMI (1997) indicates that the ECB will develop an intermediate target strategy,
that this strategy will be a sophisticated or closed-loop one, and that the choice of strategies has been narrowed
down to monetary targeting or inflation forecast targeting. Subsequently, we will focus on these alternatives The Bank of England’s Inflation Report (May 1997, p. 42) argues that “the outlook for
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inflation in two years or so depends more fundamentally on the growth of broad money and nominal
demand in relation to the supply capacity of the economy”. This still leaves aggregate demand and all
the factors influencing it of equal importance to money.  
Haldane (1996) reports that the Bank of England’s inflation forecast is an amalgamum of an
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a-theoretic Kalman-filter projection and a small structural macro model. Leigh-Pemberton (1997)
describes the forecast as a mixture of econometric analysis and judgmental corrections.
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and assume that inflation forecast targeting would strongly resemble the current practice of European central
banks relying on such strategies. That is, the inflation forecast would be based on a  set of variables assumed to
affect inflation two years ahead: aggregate demand and supply, including a detailed analysis of private
consumption, fiscal policies, labor market conditions including wage developments, other cost factors,
exchange rates and interest rates, and the developments of monetary and credit aggregates, with no explicit
weights for these different factors,  and without revealing forecasting model other than in very general terms.   
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IV.1. Decision Making Within the ECB
One important role of the intermediate target for internal decision making purposes is its function as a
focal point in central bank council debates. Political economy suggests that, for the ECB, a strong focal point
will be important, since its council will be a new institution void of historically grown rules of convention. 
Two aspects will be particularly relevant, how narrow the focal point will be and how strongly it will reflect
economic developments in the individual EMU member states.    
IV.1.1. Hierarchies of Arguments vs. Hierarchies of Decision Makers
Central bank decisions in practice are the outcome of voting games on the central bank council. Social
choice theory im plies that such games do not  deliver consistent voting outcomes unless some structure is
imposed on the process (McKelvey, 1976; Shepsle, 1979). Hierarchies are one important type of structure:
making certain alternatives inadmissible in the decision making process or making some participant superior to
others can increase the consistency and predictability of collective decisions. Monetary strategies have different
properties in this context.
Monetary targeting creates a hierarchy of arguments in central bank deliberations, as  the growth rate of
the target aggregate becomes the focal point of central bank discussions. Ideally, arguments for or against26
central bank actions are admissible only if they relate to the framework of monetary targeting; observations
from the various sectors of the economy are taken into account only if they help explain current monetary
developments and their implications for expected inflation.  In contrast, inflation forecast targeting emphasizes
that there are many important factors determining inflation, with no clear hierarchy of the arguments.
Deliberations within the central bank can therefore be expected to have a much broader range of admissible
arguments and lead to less consistency of Council decisions. 
The weaker structure of arguments under inflation forecast targeting would likely induce the ECB
Board to create a hierarchy of  decision makers instead. A possible basis for this is in the information
requirement of inflation forecast targeting. Inflation forecasts use large amounts of non-financial data that must
be fed through an analytic framework. The forecasting process described by Leigh Pemberton (1997) or
Goodhart (1998) are highly labor-intensive and time-consuming. It is natural to expect that the staff involved in
this process would be concentrated at the ECB in Frankfort, while the economics departments of the national
central banks would specialize on the national economies. The implication is that the ECB Board would have a
strong information advantage under inflation forecast targeting, and that the ECB president and the board
members would try to exploit this advantage to establish dominant positions for themselves in the Council. But
the national central bank presidents would likely be unwilling to accept such dominance, stressing the fact that
the ECB is owned by the national central banks. The outcome could be a power struggle that would make ECB
decisions inconsistent and erratic. With monetary targeting, which primarily requires data from the financial
sector that is readily available for all members of the central bank council, the distribution of information is
much more equal and the development of a  hierarchy of decision makers actors is much less likely.  
 
IV.1.2. Monetary Policy and Regional Shocks in the EMU
A second aspect of the broader data requirements of inflation forecast targeting is that all non-financial
data entering the forecast would have strong regional and almost no EMU-wide content. As long as labor
mobility remains as low as it is in Europe today and a fully integrated labor market does not exist, the concepts
of EMU employment, EMU unemployment rates, EMU wage rates etc. will necessarily remain elusive. For the
same reason, and because national fiscal policies will continue to focus on national output, the concept of
aggregate EMU demand will remain vague.  The implication is that a strategy of inflation forecast targeting
would make ECB monetary policy decisions focus strongly on regional economic trends and shocks more than27
on aggregate EMU trends and shocks. 
 This is reminiscent of the Fed’s history in the late 1920s. As Friedman and Schwarz (1963) point out,
the dominance of regional interests on the Open Market Investment Council, the principal policy making body
of the Fed at the time, prevented the Fed from developing a coherent strategy at the beginning of the Great
Depression. With a dominance of regional considerations on the ECB board, aggregate EMU business cycles
would be unnecessarily pronounced. Furthermore, as the ECB council members focus on regional
developments, the median voter’s decision over changes in monetary policy instruments would take such
developments into account, making ECB’s monetary policy responsive to asymmetric shocks at the national
level. One way to prevent such outcomes would be to insist on large majorities or even unanimous decisions,
which, however would make ECB decisions extremely status-quo biased and hence prevent timely actions.
A strong regional focus of Council decisions can be avoided by focusing on financial market variables.
In the integrated EMU financial market, it will soon be normal for citizens and businesses located in one
member state to hold deposits with and borrow money from financial institutions in other member states.
Financial market variables, will, therefore, soon loose all regional connotations. Focusing on financial
aggregates would force the ECB Council to think in terms of European aggregates output and inflation and
develop a truly European monetary policy. Importantly, it would also be a strong signal to the public that
monetary policy cannot cater to the special needs of any member economy.  
IV.2. The Signaling Aspect of Intermediate Targets
The EMI’s (1997) report on the strategy of the ECB emphasizes the value of a monetary policy strategy
as a mechanism to create accountability and, with it, help the ECB to build credibility. By announcing an
intermediate target and showing its determination to pursue it, the ECB will give the European public a chance
to monitor its actions and show its reliability. Two aspects matter in the choice of an intermediate target, the
transparency of the procedure and the degree of activism signaled to the public.
IV.2.1. Transparency and Accountability
To promote accountability of the central bank, an intermediate target strategy should be easy to
understand and to monitor for the public. Inflation forecast targeting has the advantage that it reveals potential
discrepancies between the current stance of monetary policy and its goal of price stability immediately: An Time series models in particular are notoriously  sample-dependent, implying that the
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empirical quality  of the Bank’s forecast cannot be assessed by outsiders.
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inflation forecast exceeding the target rate of (trend) inflation calls for a monetary restriction. A monetary target
is much less informative in this regard, as a growth rate of, say, 12 percent, of the money supply may or may
not be excessive at any point in time.  
However, an inflation forecast is built on a much broader and more complex framework of analysis. 
Notwithstanding the good quality of the analysis of the inflation reports currently published by some central
banks (Svensson, 1996), the sheer amount of information makes it hard for outsiders to appreciate the central
bank’s actions and reasoning.  Thus, the signaling value of the inflation forecast is reduced by the complexity
29
of its derivation, leaving considerable scope for fudging and making monetary policy look better than it is.
Monetary targets, in contrast, are derived from a much more parsimonious model, whose basic relationship is
easily understood. But monetary targets have the disadvantage that the relationship with inflationary
developments is less precise in the short  run. Revision of and deviations from the monetary target will,
therefore, require more commenting by the central bank ex post.  
While the direct relationship of the inflation forecast to the policy goal is an advantage as regards the
signaling of intentions, it is a disadvantage as regards the monitoring of central bank policies. Inflation
forecasts are typically for inflation two years ahead, so that it takes considerable time to find out how good the
forecast was and whether the central bank’s reactions to an increased forecast were appropriate. Deviations
from a monetary target can be observed much faster, requiring earlier justification from the central bank. A
related issue is accountability for deviations from the target. The link between the inflation forecast and the
central bank’s instruments is much weaker than the link between central bank instruments and monetary
aggregates, particularly narrow aggregates, since the latter include part of the central bank’s own liabilities.
Since the central bank’s control is greater in principle regarding monetary targets, the public will hold it more
accountable for deviations from such targets than for  inflation forecast errors.  
 To conclude, none of these aspects creates a clear preference for inflation forecast or monetary
targeting. The closer connection of the former to the goal of price stability suggests that adopting it as
intermediate target may have greater signal value in times of a shift in the monetary policy regime, i.e., when
price stability acquires more importance as a policy objective, while a monetary target is attractive when the
controllability of money was the source of failure of monetary policy before the strategy change. The historical29
experience confirms this: inflation forecast targeting was adopted in the early 1990s only after the credibility of
its alternatives - exchange rate and/or monetary targets or no targets at all - had been squandered, while the
Bundesbank adopted monetary targeting after a period when money growth was out of control. For the nascent
ECB, recent inflation experience will not be a problem while the procedure for controlling monetary conditions
has to be established. This suggests that a monetary target might be useful for the ECB to emphasize its
determination to prevent money growth from going out of control as a precondition to reach its goal of price
stability.  
IV.2.2. Defining the Responsibility of Monetary Policy
The Treaty on European Union mandates the ECB to secure price stability in the EMU, but leaves the
concrete meaning of this mandate unspecified. Like the Bundesbank in the early 1970s, the ECB will thus have
to define its responsibility  in EMU. The views on this range from an activist central bank which, like the
Greenspan Fed, makes itself responsible for suppressing inflationary pressures as they arise (CEPR, 1997), to a
more hands-off attitude like the Bundesbank aiming at controlling the trend inflation rate over the medium run
and focusing on the monetary policy contribution to price level movements. 
Choosing a monetary strategy will be an important opportunity for the ECB  to reveal its view of the
appropriate role for monetary policy to the public. With inflation forecast targeting, the ECB would emphasize
its desire to reach or not to exceed a certain inflation rate in the coming years, and given that it will be a new
institution it would try hard to achieve this to build its reputation. But this would force the bank to combat non-
monetary shocks to the price level should they arise in the early years. Thus, as endeavored by the authors of 
CEPR (1997), inflation forecast targeting would give the ECB the appearance of an activist central bank. In
fact, shocks are easily foreseen, as the governments of the large EMU countries are embarking on more
expansionary fiscal policies now that the restraints of the EMU entry conditions are gone. Inflation forecast
targeting then carries the risk of conflicts with the European governments that would make it difficult for the
ECB to develop its reputation and a consistent monetary policy. With a more hands-off attitude as signaled by
the combination of monetary targeting and the announcement that ECB monetary policy makes itself
responsible for inflation over the medium run, the ECB would see no need for responding to fiscal expansions
with a tight monetary contraction. It would, however, have to educate and convince the public that the rise in
the price level observed is due to bad fiscal rather than bad monetary policy. 30
The choice between an activist and a more hands-off central bank policy is a difficult one. With regard
to price stability it involves a choice between promising a more ambitious target not being quite sure whether
this can be achieved, and a vaguer and more long-run target with a greater chance of achieving it. Interestingly,
inflation forecast targeting central banks announce their inflation targets as a target range (Almeida and
Goodhart, 1996) for a precise period while the Bundesbank has always announced a precise number without
indicating the target period. The choice is thus between uncertainty in the short run and  in the long run. Which
of these announcements is more credible in the public view can hardly be determined in general. Bundesbank
Council discussions at the time reflect the concern not to engage in overly ambitious policies. To what extent
this will be a concern for the ECB depends, of course, on its council members and how they view the ECB’s
position in European macroeconomic policy.  
A related issue concerns the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. In contrast to national central
banks, the ECB will face 11 fiscal authorities, four of which are “large” relative to the size of the EMU
economy. Fiscal expansions in these economies will likely create pressure on the European price level. Taking
responsibility to respond to such situations would draw the ECB into the middle of the coordination problem of
fiscal policies among the EMU member states.  As the ECB becomes a part of that coordination, it would risk
making monetary policy enter compromise with the governments and their policy goals frequently. With a more
hands-off attitude as signaled by monetary targeting, the governments would be forced to coordinate fiscal
policies among themselves, including disciplining each other to refrain from fiscal expansions, and leaving
monetary policy with the possibility to pursue a low trend inflation rate.
We can illustrate this again, assuming that the central bank either sets a predetermined money growth
rate or a reaction function with m = -￿%. Suppose that there are now two governments, each setting a fiscal
instrument g, i = 1,2, and let the common inflation rate be  % = m + ￿g +   ￿ g . Assume that the governments i 12 .  
wish to maximize a utility function U = -1/2 [(g - g )  + % ], where g  has a fixed and a stochastic component ii i i
*2 2 *
as before. In each case, assume that the governments coordinate their fiscal policies, i.e., they maximize the
sum of their utility functions. The equilibrium reaction functions are g = g /(1+4￿ ) with a predetermined ii
*2
monetary policy, and  g = g /(1+4￿￿ ) when monetary policy responds to a price increase every period. Since ii
*2
￿   ￿  1, we see that with a predetermined monetary policy government  respond less to a fiscal preference shock.
Thus, a more hands-off definition of the ECB’s responsibility may induce greater fiscal discipline in the EMU,
thus facilitating the ECB’s task to achieve price stability in the long run. 31
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